CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 252

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9. CYPRUS

The Committee considered our policy towards Cyprus with particular

regard to what action we might take should a major change in the political

status of Cyprus take place or appear imminent.

area.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that our interests in Cyprus lay in avoiding

the instability that would result on the south-eastern flank of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation if there were serious friction or war

between Greece and Turkey about Cyprus; in maintaining good relations with

Turkey and the overflying facilities which she granted us; in retaining, while we needed them our Soveriegn Base Areas (SBAs) and other facilities

in Cyprus and in keeping Cyprus in the Western world and in the sterling

Unless circumstances changed, these interests would best be served by a policy of impartiality towards the parties concerned in the Cyprus problem, by urging moderation on them, by continuing to assist towards any settlement likely to be acceptable to all parties concerned (being prepared to consider contributing the Dhekelia SBA if this would achieve a settlement) and by continuing to work through the United Nations in Cyrpus

whenever possible. The position in Cyprus was however very precarious and

situations might continue to arise in which our various needs were in

conflict with each other; these situations could only be considered on

their merits in each case.

There had been reports that an attempt might be made to change the political status of Cyprus, and, although this did not seem likely, we

should nevertheless give some consideration to what we might do in the

various possible cases. The least unlikely possibility was that a

settlement might be reached between Greece and Turkey, though not the

Government of Cyprus, which involved the union of Cyprus with Greece and some sort of compensation for Turkey. This would present great difficulties for us; much would depend on the terms of the settlement that was reached, the action taken to erforce it and our assessment of the attitude of the people

to Cyprus. We should need to act very cautiously but we might wish to offer one of our SEAs as a contribution to a settlement if appropriate in the

light of the circumstances as a whole and having regard to the attitude

of the Cypriots themselves.

A less likely possibility was that there would be a Greek military coup against the Government of Cyprus with or without the agreement of Turkey. If this were to take place we should make it clear to all parties

concerned that we were strongly opposed to the use of force as a means of

achieving a settlement. Finally, and equally unlikely, there was a

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